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Letter dated 22 January 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on Somalia (see annex I), submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2372 (2017), in which the Council requested the African Union to report regularly on the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia, and the related communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (see annex II).

I should be grateful if you would bring the report to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

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Annex I

Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the situation in Somalia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2372 (2017) of 30 August 2017, wherein the African Union was requested to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

2. The report provides an update on the implementation of the AMISOM mandate and resolution 2372 (2017) for the period from September to November 2017. The report concludes with observations on the way forward.

II. Major developments

Main political developments

3. The political landscape in Somalia continues to be intertwined with recurring challenges and new developments on several critical issues. Without the resolution of those issues, the country will be unable to achieve progress in its governance and State-building efforts. The challenges and developments include the constitutional review process, the relationship between the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states, the dialogue between Galmudug State and Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a and preparations for the 2020 elections.

4. The spillover effect of the Gulf crisis tends to be at the centre of the aforementioned challenges. Prior to the restoration by the Federal Government of Somalia of budgetary support to the federal member states in October 2017, a number of the states had approached Gulf countries for assistance. At the time there was a lack of political agreement on resource-sharing and priorities in view of the great financial demands at both the federal and state levels. As a result, several of the federal member states aligned with Saudi Arabia and its allies against the neutral stance of the Federal Government of Somalia in the Gulf crisis. This has not only continued to fuel deep divisions and tensions between the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states, but has also raised difficult constitutional questions, just as Somalia was planning to launch its constitutional review process in 2017–2019. These divisions and tensions led to intra-state opposition that resulted in the unseating of the leaders of Galmudug and South-West states, owing to perceived interference by the Federal Government of Somalia.

5. One of the consequences of the deep divisions and tensions between the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states was the stalling of the plans to hold a national constitutional convention on 8–10 October 2017, at which the constitutional review process would have been officially launched. The federal member states, the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission and the Joint Parliamentary Constitutional Review Oversight Committee boycotted the process. The boycott derailed seven months of successful efforts that included wide consultations with the federal member states by the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs on the constitutional review process. The 16-point communiqué of the Kismaayo meeting points to the resolve of the federal member states to enhance regional cooperation and pursue a common position on issues relating to security, politics, federalism and reconciliation. In this regard, clarity is required on the interpretation of article 53 (1) of the provisional constitution, on the

basis of a common understanding and agreement between the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states. This will enable the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states to establish the modalities for consultations on specific matters that have a direct impact on the federal member states, in line with that article.

6. While the nine-day high-level consultative meeting held in Mogadishu in November 2017, which was chaired by the President of Somalia, did not resolve the deep division and challenges facing the relationship between the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states, it facilitated the reaching of a consensus between the Federal Government of Somalia and the leaders of the federal member states on the establishment of an expert committee to look into issues of power- and resource-sharing over the coming six months. Six critical issues were agreed upon at the meeting, namely: improving security in the country and eliminating terrorism; promoting a federal system in the country; fast-tracking the review of the Constitution under a unified approach; preparing the 2020 electoral process; strengthening cooperation between the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states; and promoting development projects and humanitarian aid. In addition, the integration of security forces under a unified national army, based on a proportional contribution from the federal member states, in line with the national security architecture, was also highlighted as critical.

7. The Federal Government of Somalia has made progress in the preparations for the 2020 elections by working on the design of the electoral system/process with key government institutions, including the National Independent Electoral Commission, the Boundaries and Federation Commission, the Office of the Prime Minister, the Office of the President, the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development. The African Union continues to support this process and the National Independent Electoral Commission at the technical and capacity-building levels. The African Union Commission also participated at the continental forum of electoral management bodies, which was held in Kigali in November 2017.

8. At the regional level, the new Government was expected to prioritize the consolidation of federal structures by establishing district and local councils. South-West and Jubbaland states enacted their local government laws ahead of the formation of district and local councils. Once implemented, the laws are expected to facilitate the smooth implementation of the AMISOM mandate and fulfil one of the key conditions for the AMISOM handover to the Somali National Security Forces. However, the political turbulence, as exemplified by the sudden ousting of the President of HirShabelle State, Ali Osoble, and the attempts to oust the leaders of Galmudug and South-West states, the persistent conflicts due to clan dynamics in some of those states and the elusive dialogue between Galmudug state and Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a have together limited progress in the development of local governance laws and potentially undermined efforts aimed at consolidating the federal structures.

Key security developments

9. AMISOM continues to contribute towards the improvement of the security situation in Somalia. Despite the continued asymmetrical threat posed by Al-Shabaab, the security situation is gradually improving. The prime targets of Al-Shabaab attacks remain the Federal Government of Somalia, AMISOM and the forward operating bases of the national security forces throughout the sectors. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) remain Al-Shabaab's principal weapons of choice. Despite the increase in IED attacks, the AMISOM identification rate increased to 45 per cent in

August 2017, compared with 28 per cent in July 2017. However, there is a need to further increase the Mission's counter-IED capability.

10. On 29 September 2017, in Bariirre village of Awdheegle District, suspected Al-Shabaab militias staged a complex attack on a military base of the Somali National Army. Al-Shabaab managed to escape with eight to ten military vehicles, including three armoured vehicles mounted with guns, and an assortment of weapons, including 82-mm mortars, 12.7-mm anti-aircraft weapons and 23-mm anti-aircraft weapons. The attack on Bariirre was the fourth in 2017 and the third in September 2017 in which national army forces were overrun, pointing to a surge in Al-Shabaab operations and indicating the limited capacity of the national army to defend its positions. Furthermore, in the month of October, Somalia witnessed an Al-Shabaab attack in Mogadishu on a scale not previously seen. The blast at Zoobe junction in Mogadishu on 14 October claimed the lives of at least 358 people and injured 228 others, exposing serious flaws in intelligence and the broader political challenges facing the Federal Government of Somalia. The increasing frequency of Al-Shabaab attacks and the rising number of associated casualties threaten the fragile security gains made in Somalia ahead of the reduction in the number of AMISOM troops scheduled for the end of 2018.

11. Following the Mogadishu attack, the Director General of the National Intelligence and Security Agency, Abdullahi Mohamed Ali, and the Head of the Somali Police Force, Brigadier General Abdihakim Dahir Said, were removed from their posts by the Federal Cabinet on 29 October. This move aimed at restoring public confidence after an escalation in Al-Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu, including a complex attack on the Naso-Hablod hotel just two weeks after the deadly attack on 14 October. President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo returned to the country on 25 October, following a tour of three countries to marshal support and resources for an expanded offensive against Al-Shabaab in the wake of the deadly attacks on Mogadishu. The President indicated that he has secured the commitment of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda to reinforce the efforts of the national security forces to counter Al-Shabaab.

12. In line with the mandate, AMISOM will undertake a gradual and phased reduction and reorganization of its forces aimed at providing a greater support role as the national security forces progressively take the lead in security tasks in the country. AMISOM, working closely with the Federal Government of Somalia and international partners, has pressed ahead with the implementation of the commitments made at the Conference held in London in May 2017 on the implementation of the national security architecture and the new security pact, the outcomes of the African Union-United Nations joint review and the new mandate of the African Union Peace and Security Council, in a complementary manner, to ensure effective operations.

13. Collectively, the Federal Government of Somalia and its partners have put in place the comprehensive approach to security mechanism to deliver the reforms aligned with the national security architecture. In August, November and December, the Federal Government, in consultation with the regional administrations, reached agreements on the outstanding political issues in the national security architecture (such as the distribution of forces, policies, structures and implementation plans) and successfully carried out an assessment to determine the operational readiness of the national security forces, all of which are necessary to deliver the envisioned security sector reforms.

14. The operational readiness assessment identified critical gaps that will affect the efficient and effective operation of the national security forces and the transition of security roles from AMISOM. In this regard, it is noted that the takeover by Somalia of primary security responsibility from AMISOM is dependent on enhancing the

capacity of the national security forces. As a result, the enhancement and better coordination of training support for the national security forces are critical.

Humanitarian situation

15. The humanitarian situation remains dire in many parts of Somalia. The Federal Government of Somalia requested a post-disaster/drought needs assessment, which brings together the humanitarian community and donors. The assessment seeks to evaluate the impact of the drought and the response required and evaluate the resilience level of the affected population with a view to drawing up a recovery and resilience framework. The underlying vision is to ensure that the next drought does not turn into a famine.

16. Since September 2017, rains have occurred across the country, marking the start of the *deyr* rainy season. The Shabelle River is already full in certain portions owing to rains in the Ethiopian highlands. Efforts are under way to strengthen embankments to prevent flooding. The onset of the rains resulted in movements of internally displaced persons to prepare land for farming. However, there are greater numbers still coming into settlements for internally displaced persons in Baidoa, Gaalkacyo and Jubbaland (Doolow, Luuq, Baardheere and Dhooble).

17. Humanitarian agencies have reported access challenges in Boosaaso, Qandala and Baidoa, affecting the area of influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and therefore limiting life-saving interventions.

III. Implementation of Security Council resolution 2372 (2017)

Implementation of the national security architecture and the new Somalia pact

18. Working closely with the Federal Government of Somalia and international partners, AMISOM has pressed ahead with the implementation of the commitments made at the conference held in London in May 2017 on the national security architecture and the new security pact, the outcomes of the African Union-United Nations joint review and the communiqué of the 700th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, in a complementary manner, to ensure effective operations and a smooth transition from AMISOM-led to Somali-led security.

19. In follow-up to the inaugural conference of the Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM on the transitioning of security responsibilities, which was held in July 2017, in August 2017, commanders of AMISOM and the national security forces held a planning session for joint coordinated operations for the rest of 2017 and beyond, with the main objectives of disrupting, degrading and defeating Al-Shabaab and other armed groups, protecting population centres, opening and securing main supply routes and agreeing to the handover of a number of forward operating bases.

20. AMISOM is participating fully in the implementation mechanism overseeing the delivery on the National Development Plan and the national security architecture through the comprehensive approach to security in the next four years. Since August, AMISOM components and units have realigned to participate in the implementation of the comprehensive approach to security and its relevant strands, as well as the relevant pillars of the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility/National Development Plan framework. Following the inaugural meeting on strand 1 of the comprehensive approach in late August 2017, AMISOM generated a matrix of prioritized activities with set milestones to realize the objective of ensuring effective AMISOM operations (military, police and civilian) in the implementation of the concept of operations and the mission implementation plan. Strand 1 would be

studying the matrix for operationalization through technical, operational and deeper coordination efforts.

Receiving Al-Shabaab defectors and supporting the Defectors Rehabilitation Programme

21. In resolution 2372 (2017), the Security Council mandated AMISOM to receive on a transitory basis Al-Shabaab defectors, as appropriate, and in coordination with the United Nations and the Federal Government of Somalia. In response to the presidential amnesty and the surrender of Mukhtar Robow, a senior Al-Shabaab leader, to the Federal Government, members of Al-Shabaab continue to renounce violence and extremist ideology. AMISOM and the Federal Government of Somalia continued to receive defectors and hand them over to the National Intelligence and Security Agency under existing relevant guidelines during the period under review.

22. AMISOM plays a key role in the outreach and reception phase, the first two pillars of the national programme for the treatment and handling of disengaging fighters and youth at risk, while other partners have concentrated on the pillars relating to screening, rehabilitation and reintegration. AMISOM has taken the initiative to build the capacity of personnel involved in the Defectors Rehabilitation Programme of the Federal Government of Somalia. Even though significant progress has been made towards handling defectors, there remain the challenges posed by the unclear policy on defectors and the lack of financial and infrastructural support for the Defectors Rehabilitation Programme.

Uniformed personnel

23. AMISOM uniformed personnel, deployed across the six sectors, currently number a maximum of 22,126.

Military component

24. The current military strength is 21,586 troops, which is projected to be reduced by 1,000 personnel to a total of 20,586 by 31 December 2017. The troops in theatre are composed of 6,220 soldiers from Uganda, 5,338 from Burundi, 3,664 from Kenya, 1,000 from Djibouti, 4,395 from Ethiopia and 75 staff officers from force headquarters. All AMISOM troop-contributing countries have been notified to effect reductions during their troop rotations in December 2017.

25. The security landscape in south-central Somalia remains comparatively stable in spite of isolated Al-Shabaab attacks in the form of vehicle-borne IEDs, ambushes, assassinations and grenade attacks. The problem of IEDs along the main supply routes linking forward operating bases remains persistent, constraining the freedom of movement and sustainability of AMISOM and the national security forces. The Al-Shabaab threat level remains high in Banadir region, including Mogadishu, where militants have continued to infiltrate vehicle-borne IEDs with the aim of disrupting public security and discrediting the Federal Government.

26. In pursuit of the strategic objectives set out in resolution 2372 (2017) of reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other opposition armed groups, AMISOM is currently engaged in Operation Safari Hunter along the Juba Corridor, in collaboration with the Somali national army and regional forces. Operation Stabilize Mogadishu is also ongoing, with the aim of clearing Al-Shabaab networks and restoring security in Mogadishu from vehicle-borne IED attacks. In line with the concept of operations of 2016, AMISOM has engaged in clearance operations for the main supply routes, which are aimed at securing key logistical supply routes in areas liberated from Al-Shabaab. These clearance operations are also meant to facilitate

humanitarian operations in all sectors, as well as to secure additional main supply routes in the long term.

27. Despite AMISOM having registered significant achievements in combating the Al-Shabaab threat and stabilizing Somalia, Al-Shabaab continues to exploit capacity gaps between AMISOM sectors and their overstretched lines of operation. This has enabled the group's continued freedom of movement and action. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab is still capable of swiftly amassing its militias and executing large-scale attacks, taking advantage of its ability to blend and hide within the local population and effectively using small squads or Amniyat cells to execute vehicle-borne IED attacks and carry out targeted assassinations.

Transition of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the national security forces

28. AMISOM forces continued to undertake joint operations with the national security forces, and Operation Stabilize Mogadishu is currently under way, with the aim of not only degrading Al-Shabaab, but also transferring operational experience to the national security forces through mentoring. AMISOM, in collaboration with partners, has also continued to train key personnel in the national security forces, both locally and regionally.

29. The Prime Minister, Hassan Khayre, launched the operational readiness assessment in Mogadishu on 15 August 2017. The exercise, which is led by the Federal Government with the active participation of AMISOM, the United Nations, international partners and the federal member states, is expected to yield a credible picture of the current state of the national security forces and provide the basis for planning the transition of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces. In preparation for the gradual handover of security responsibilities, in September and October, AMISOM, in collaboration with partners, conducted the operational readiness assessment of the Somali national army, with the aim of verifying its operational capabilities, including staffing, training, equipment, sustainment capability and infrastructure. The table of organization and equipment defined in the Guulwade (Victory) Plan serves as the initial basis for decisions on staffing and equipment.

Police component

30. Under resolution 2372 (2017), the AMISOM police force was authorized to increase its number from 540 personnel to 1,040, consisting of 7 senior leadership team officers, 233 individual police officers (up from 113) and five formed police units of 160 each (up from three formed police units of 140 personnel each). However, the component is currently made up of 400 personnel, consisting of 6 senior leadership team officers, 114 individual police officers and two formed police units of 140 each, from Nigeria and Uganda, respectively.

31. The number is expected to increase gradually by 500 personnel, starting in December 2017 with an increase in the number of individual police officers and formed police units. The African Union Commission has a detailed deployment plan that is being implemented, including the augmentation of the current two formed police units to a strength of 160 from 140 by January 2017, as well as the deployment of the third formed police unit from Sierra Leone with 160 personnel; an increase in the numbers of individual police officers by 120, which will go into effect by the first quarter of 2018; and the deployment of two new formed police units of 160 personnel each. Nigeria has made an offer to provide the first additional formed police unit and deployment, which, following an assessment of operational capability, is expected before the end of the first quarter of 2018. Offers for the second formed police unit

are being solicited, and the unit is expected to be available for deployment by the second quarter of 2018.

32. The AMISOM police component has made significant achievements, despite the challenges encountered during the period from September to November 2017. In terms of operational support to the national police force, AMISOM police delivered professional, responsive and robust policing in accordance with the operational support mandate. Daily high-visibility patrols were conducted jointly with the national police force and other national security forces around vital installations, government buildings, places of worship, busy roads and junctions to proactively deter criminal activities. In addition, AMISOM police jointly carried out three intelligence-led cordon and search operations with the national security forces in various districts in Mogadishu. Support was also provided in terms of security during the excavation and evacuation of victims following the blast in Mogadishu on 14 October 2017. Joint operations conducted by the national police force and AMISOM police enable government officials, Somali communities and the international partners around Mogadishu, Kismaayo and Baidoa to conduct their daily activities and business peacefully. With the planned increase in the number of formed police units, AMISOM police plans to expand its operational support to the state capitals of HirShabelle (Jawhar), Jubbaland (Kismaayo) and South-West states (Baidoa).

33. AMISOM police continued to mentor and advise the Somali police officers, as well as conduct on-the-job training, in the four police divisions in Banadir region, Baidoa, Kismaayo and Beledweyne. The mentoring, which was based on theoretical and practical themes with clear objectives and outcomes, enhanced the individual capacities of the Somali police personnel and enabled them to provide competent basic policing services to their communities. With the proposed increase in AMISOM police strength, the component plans to expand mentoring to functional police stations in Jawhar and Cadaado, the capitals of HirShabelle and Galmudug states, respectively.

34. On the institutional police reform agenda, the component, jointly with Somali police leadership, UNSOM and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), completed an evaluation of the Somali police force with the aim of assessing its operational readiness in terms of numbers, capacities and locations. In addition, in September and October 2017, the police component procured and handed over assorted equipment, including investigation kits and three vehicles to the police stations in Mogadishu, Kismaayo and Baidoa. The items and logistics are intended to improve the working conditions at the police stations and to facilitate a quick response to emergency calls and security incidents.

35. In the effort to support the implementation of the new policing model, in November 2017, AMISOM police, with funding support from the Government of Denmark, assisted the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states with undertaking a mission to Nigeria to study the Nigerian model of policing, which operates under a federal structure, with a view to enabling informed decisions on a workable model for Somalia.

36. The AMISOM police component has also continued to develop operational and management policies for the national police force to assist in management, operations, command and control of police institutions. The communication policy, the drug use policy and the public order management policy for the federal and the state police are being developed. In addition, the component reactivated and operationalized the National Central Bureau at Somali Police Headquarters (office of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)). This has connected the National Central Bureau in Mogadishu to other international central bureaux, at which intelligence on high-profile criminals is shared and monitored.

37. In terms of enhancing the capacity of individual Somali police personnel, between July and November 2017, the AMISOM police component successfully trained 167 Somali police personnel from the federal and state levels on a package of specialized courses. The training programmes are aimed at building the individual and institutional capacities of the national police force to conduct effective policing and to conduct training for its own personnel. Similar courses, as well as other specialized police courses on counter-terrorism, middle and junior management and basic criminal investigations, will be conducted in December 2017, in all the federal member states, subject to the availability of funds.

38. AMISOM police continued to support the national police force in efforts to protect the rights of vulnerable persons, in particular women and girls. The AMISOM police component closely monitored the management and disposal of sexual and gender-based violence cases reported at various police stations. This resulted in the proper investigation and disposal of nine alleged cases of sexual and gender-based violence that were reported at the Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismaayo police stations. Furthermore, the component mentored the Somali police gender focal point desk officers on the investigation and handling of cases and victims of sexual and gender-based violence, the referral pathway for the victims and the role of the first responder in incidences of such violence. In collaboration with the Women's Protection Unit of the civilian component, the AMISOM police also conducted training for the national police on the protection of women and children, with a focus on the special protection of women and girls under the Fourth Geneva Convention, sexual and gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence, which was aimed at building the capacities of national police officers to respond to and prevent violations and protect the rights of women and girls.

Civilian component support for military and police tasks

39. The AMISOM civilian component has remained fully operational to support the Mission's military and police tasks in Somalia. AMISOM established a defector rehabilitation working group and continued to provide support for the civil-military cooperation field activities relating to early recovery and social reconciliation. In the area of dialogue and local reconciliation, AMISOM continues to work closely with the Federal Government of Somalia in activities aimed at helping to extend government authority. More specifically, AMISOM has engaged with clan elders and local communities in Shabelle Hoose, Baidoa and Kismaayo to encourage community-level dialogue and reconciliation.

40. In the coming period, AMISOM will be complementing its military operations with the execution of quick-impact projects, especially in the areas of education and community infrastructure development, as well as supporting the defector programme and social reconciliation among local communities.

Civil affairs, early recovery and stabilization

41. The AMISOM Civil Affairs Unit is working closely with the Federal Government and partners to deliver on early recovery and stabilization activities and roles that cut across the responsibilities of the civilian, police and military components of AMISOM. As part of early recovery and stabilization efforts, AMISOM has provided the key contact point for liaison with other partners. AMISOM engaged directly with local communities in the identification of relevant early recovery programmes for AMISOM and partners, while liaising with and between the Federal Government of Somalia, the administrations of the federal member states and local communities on matters related to early recovery and stabilization. AMISOM continues to identify and implement both quick-impact projects and peace-strengthening projects that relate to community recovery and the

extension of State authority. Equally, in order to enhance institutional performance within the federal member states, AMISOM has facilitated institutional capacity-building.

42. AMISOM continues to support the national stabilization strategy and all government programmes, such as the Wadajir National Framework for Local Governance, by facilitating the deployment of local administration and support for the establishment of an effective coordination mechanism for disengaged fighters. In this regard, AMISOM has continued to participate effectively in the monthly stabilization forum of strand 3 of the comprehensive approach to security.

Humanitarian support

43. The AMISOM Humanitarian Liaison Unit continues to enhance the relations between AMISOM and the humanitarian community and partners, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in order to facilitate the support necessary for the affected population, particularly in those areas recovered from Al-Shabaab. The Unit continues to work closely with the AMISOM military component and especially the civil-military coordination sections to secure main supply routes, including in areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation and those critical for the provision of logistical support to AMISOM. The Unit also works with the Federal Government of Somalia and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management to facilitate the conduct of humanitarian needs assessments in its area of operations through the provision of logistical support and security and the delivery of humanitarian assistance in areas that have been secured from Al-Shabaab.

Protection of civilians and human rights

44. AMISOM has continued to implement its mandate in compliance with the provisions of resolution 2372 (2017) by ensuring that it carries out both its offensive and defensive operations in compliance with the applicable international human rights and international humanitarian laws. To further cement this, the AMISOM Force Commander has reminded the operational commanders of the directive to place a premium on the protection of civilians in all operational undertakings. The directive specifically instructs AMISOM commanders to comply with the Mission's indirect fire policy and the policy on prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, to respect the culture and national laws and to ensure that AMISOM air operations are conducted in strict compliance with the applicable international humanitarian law.

45. At the technical level, AMISOM, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) continued to hold monthly meetings, at which issues of human rights, compliance with international humanitarian law, allegations of rights violations and any conduct or discipline issues that arose were discussed, decisions were taken on action and, in some cases, investigations into allegations were conducted.

46. The Mission also continues to deploy its Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell to track and document all allegations of civilian harm occasioned by its activities in AMISOM areas of responsibility in south-central Somalia. Increased awareness of the Cell and an emphasis on civilian casualty prevention and mitigation has been achieved through seven in-mission induction training sessions, which were held at Mission headquarters and in sectors 3, 4 and 6 for all components (military, police and civilian) in the period under review. Local NGOs are also involved under the civil-military cooperation arrangements with a view to explaining the presence and function of the AMISOM Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell. Despite funding challenges, the Cell has tracked allegations against

the Mission in the period under consideration and submitted its findings to the Mission leadership. In terms of making the Cell fully operational and effective, the African Union has deployed a Military Adviser to the Cell, a post that had been vacant until August 2017.

47. The Cell has compiled a list of individuals and their families who are eligible for the AMISOM ex gratia payment, which will be made as soon as funds are made available for that purpose. The list is being updated as required. Standard operating procedures on ex gratia payments to guide the amends process were drafted in October 2016. In response to an observed increase in road traffic accidents, standard operating procedures are being developed with a view to reducing the occurrence of such accidents. The major challenges faced include the lack of funds to implement the ex gratia payments reflected in the standard operating procedures, inadequate staffing numbers, leading to deficient representation in the sectors, delayed dissemination of information on civilian casualties from the sectors, unavailability of witnesses during investigations owing to the security situation and inadequate investigating capacity.

48. In order to address the issue of child soldiers, AMISOM, along with other international partners, continues to implement the 2017–2018 workplan focusing on children associated with armed conflict. In line with the mandate to refocus its activities towards its exit from Somalia, AMISOM has been taking practical steps to transfer some of its skills to identified and capable Somali nationals. During the period under consideration, the focus has been on training, mentoring and monitoring Somalis, in order to disseminate thematic knowledge, which they are expected to pass on to their colleagues in Mogadishu and the regions.

49. AMISOM has trained a pool of Somali trainers on child protection and the prevention of the recruitment and use of child soldiers during armed conflict. These trainers have been mentored over the last six months to plan, prepare and undertake independent training activities for their counterparts in the respective institutions and security forces. Since the beginning of the year, the Mission has trained and qualified 65 trainers representing the various security forces and line ministries at both the federal and state levels. The trainers have now started supporting training activities and community engagement.

50. To facilitate closer collaboration between the Somali security forces and key line ministries, the mission has supported the establishment of a technical committee representing the ministries responsible for defence, internal security, women's rights and human rights, education and justice. This committee engages in vetting activities on all recruitment drives undertaken by the Government and also deals with issues relating to child soldiers as rights violations. This is being replicated across the thematic cells within the Protection Unit. To enhance buy-in, the Mission is organizing a high-level workshop at the end of November for principals of key line ministries and heads of training at the various training schools. This is to build more synergy between the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states and to map out a way forward in dealing with disengaged child soldiers and prevent the recruitment and use of children as soldiers.

51. The Peace and Security Council has instructed the Mission to strengthen its human rights investigative capacity. The current investigative capability of the Mission is ad hoc. Discussions are under way on the possibility of recruiting additional human rights officers for the Mission, which would allow AMISOM to maintain human rights officers and investigators in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismaayo and Beledweyne.

52. Issues relating to the protection of women in armed conflict, including the prevention of and response to sexual and gender-based violence and conflict-related

sexual violence, were incorporated into four induction programmes in the period under review. In addition, among other sources, the Ceebla crisis line has remained an instrumental tool for AMISOM to monitor violations, especially sexual violence committed against women and children (boys and girls). Furthermore, information, education and communication materials on sexual gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence were developed, printed and are available to support sensitization programmes on prevention and response to sexual violence in the period under consideration.

Gender mainstreaming and preventing and countering violent extremism

53. On 31 October and 1 November 2017, AMISOM reviewed its existing gender mainstreaming policy to take into account the Mission's focus on support to the Somali national security forces in incorporating gender issues, in line with the AMISOM transition.

54. The Mission is continuing to implement the African Union gender policy and resolution 1325 (2000) to enhance the implementation of the Mission's mandate. To this end, during the reporting period, the relevant unit within the Mission provided technical support to the relevant line ministries with regard to gender mainstreaming in the review process of the Constitution and, while representing AMISOM in strand 4 of the comprehensive approach to security, with regard to the implementation of the action plan on preventing and countering violent extremism.

IV. Coordination with the United Nations

55. UNSOM, UNSOS and AMISOM have increased their engagement at all levels, including in the strategic Senior Leadership Coordination Forum, in order to enhance coordination efforts on the ground. During the period under review, monthly meetings of the Forum were held, focusing mainly on coordination, information-sharing, security, human rights, logistics support, deployments and drawdown-related issues.

56. The civilian component of AMISOM continued its close collaboration with the United Nations through a monthly meeting of the working group on civil-military cooperation, the newly established AMISOM working group on defector rehabilitation and coordination and information-sharing meetings with the United Nations Integrated Electoral Support Group. The AMISOM-UNSOM-UNSOS technical-level meetings were held monthly in the period under review.

57. On the security front, several coordination forums meet to constantly review local, regional and international security developments. These forums include the airport security stakeholders committee, with the AMISOM crisis management team transitioning into a joint crisis management team to encompass the United Nations, AMISOM, the Federal Government of Somalia, diplomatic missions and partners in the Mission area. Decisions taken by the team are then acted upon by the joint crisis management working group, which is a technical body, to work out mitigation measures in response to any crisis situation. The security teams of AMISOM, the United Nations and the Federal Government of Somalia continue to conduct joint security assessments and work closely to successfully host major conferences and to protect civilians and prevent Al-Shabaab attacks in the green zones of Mogadishu, Kismaayo, Baidoa, Beledwyne, Johwar and Adaado. These concerted efforts have so far helped to thwart and repel several attacks targeting the airport and base camps.

V. United Nations logistical support

General status of United Nations support to AMISOM

58. The United Nations continues to support AMISOM through UNSOS pursuant to the memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and the African Union. The categories of support are related to logistics and do not include salaries, mission subsistence allowances, troop and police allowances or death and disability compensation, which are covered by the European Union on a scale that is not commensurate with that of United Nations peacekeeping missions. Some partners provide financial support through the AMISOM trust fund, which covers the recruitment of consultants specialized in mission training and the acquisition of operational equipment. The trust fund is currently depleted, and a donor conference convened on 9 October 2017 did not produce any contributions.

59. However, the reduction of the United Nations peacekeeping budget has had a negative impact on AMISOM. The withdrawal of three air assets from the UNSOS fleet has adversely affected the delivery of logistics supplies and critical support to AMISOM. An initial reduction of the flight hours in support of AMISOM to 115 hours, which was recently increased to 183 hours, also had a negative impact on the timely delivery of logistical support. This has further been compounded by the onset of the rainy season, which makes most of the roads impassable. In view of this inability to support remote positions by air, AMISOM has begun to reconfigure its forces and positions, concentrating on the main supply routes, where the IED threat remains high, while alternative measures to provide support are being explored. IEDs remain the main threat on the main supply routes and have resulted in casualties and the destruction of equipment at unacceptably high levels. The logistical constraint has had a negative effect on all AMISOM sectors, in particular in relation to the movement of urgent high-value supplies and rations. It has also resulted in the forward operating bases running out of supplies, including food, which is compounded by increased Al-Shabaab attacks on road resupply convoys, with the resultant losses of life.

60. It should also be noted that UNSOS has not yet completed the construction of the sector hubs owing to a lack of funding. For instance, sector 5, occupied by the Burundian contingent, does not have the facilities necessary in terms of fixed accommodation and storage facilities. Maintenance of the partner-owned equipment, mainly the armoured personnel carriers, which are the responsibility of UNSOS, is also a challenge; the serviceability rate of these armoured personnel carriers is currently at 46 per cent.

61. The "push quantities" concept for petroleum, oils and lubricants, which is designed to improve accountability and resource utilization, has already been introduced in Mogadishu international airport and commences in sector 4 from the beginning of November 2017. It is scheduled to be rolled out to other sectors at the beginning of December 2017. Efforts have been made to educate the end users on the implementation of the new system so that they appreciate and own it for better service delivery.

62. In line with its mandate to gradually hand over security responsibility to the national security forces, AMISOM handed over the Mogadishu stadium in November 2017. This facility houses two formed police units and troops of the Uganda People's Defence Forces. Alternative facilities have been identified in Jazeera 2. However, these facilities will require some effort to bring them up to an acceptable standard for occupation by the incoming personnel. The redeployment of the personnel is being planned in this light and a joint AMISOM-UNSOS team has already been established to assess the requirements and support needed for the development and upgrading of Jazeera.

VI. Observations

63. In the light of the above, I would like to make a number of brief observations:

(a) First, the operational readiness assessment identified critical gaps that affect the efficient and effective operation of the national security forces and implementation of the transition of security roles from AMISOM. The outcomes of the assessment, backed by the planned drawdown of 1,000 AMISOM military personnel in December 2017, escalating insecurity and the lack of resources for AMISOM and the national security forces to undertake robust military operations cast doubts on the envisioned timetable for the transition of security responsibility from AMISOM to the national security forces. In this regard, the development of a realistic conditions-based transition plan before 15 April 2018, with clear target dates for the transfer of security responsibility from AMISOM to Somali security forces is essential in order to ensure the alignment of support for the national security forces and the Federal Government of Somalia, as well to enable sustainable and predictable financing for AMISOM;

(b) Second, while the various management measures being put in place to enhance the Mission's operational effectiveness and efficiency, with UNSOS support, are welcome, it must be stressed that predictable and sustainable resourcing will be critical in delivering the operational requirements, including adequate logistical support, force enablers and multipliers for the successful implementation of the transition. Key gaps in the area of specialists, equipment for the level II hospitals and counter-IED capabilities need to be addressed and mission enabling units provided in all operational sectors. Resourcing for the whole of the transition, in a predictable and sustainable manner, for AMISOM and the national security forces, is key. In this regard, the consultations initiated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on funding options for AMISOM are welcome. These consultations should be as broad as possible and be undertaken in close collaboration with the African Union Commission, in order to ensure that key perspectives inform the report of the Secretary-General;

(c) Third, the finalization of the transition plan, following the presentation of the findings of the operational readiness assessment, will allow for division of labour between the national security forces, AMISOM and partners, as well as developing the overall requirements for support to AMISOM and the national security forces. This transition plan will also need to encompass planning on joint operations, as well as the collapse or handover of non-strategic forward operating bases, in order to generate the forces necessary to undertake offensive operations. This comprehensive verified assessment of current capabilities and requirements of the Somali security institutions should be the basis for enhanced coordination of the support provided by international partners to security institutions in Somalia, as well as considerations for resourcing the transition from AMISOM. In this respect, consideration should be given to the development of enhanced cooperation, coordination and coherence through agreed arrangements on the provision of support by partners to the security sector and institution-building in Somalia;

(d) Fourth, slow progress by the Federal Government on the establishment of local governance structures, coupled with slow recovery and stabilization efforts in liberated areas, has had a negative impact on the capitalization of AMISOM clearing and holding efforts. Therefore, timely deployment of the additional police personnel will be critical in expanding AMISOM police presence outside the state capitals and supporting the extension of policing services by the national police force in the recovered areas with a view to extending State authority and providing basic public services;

(e) Fifth, there are a number of positive developments with regard to the adherence by AMISOM to compliance and accountability standards. This has been achieved through concerted efforts to put in place a number of prevention, monitoring and reporting, and response mechanisms. Nevertheless, this can be sustained only through the continued strengthening of these mechanisms, including specialist staffing and adequate resourcing. The unique partnership in Somalia between the African Union and the United Nations provides an opportunity for the two organizations to forge an institutionalized partnership in the enhancement of compliance in peace support operations, with AMISOM as a starting point. Such a predictable partnership would be in line with the Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, signed in April 2017 by the leadership of the two organizations;

(f) Last, while the transition plan focuses on Somali security institutions, sustained focus and attention on progress towards key political and governance-related conditions need to be monitored and supported, including at the level of the federal member states to ensure the sustainability of any security gains. This will also necessitate sustained political dialogue between the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states to allow for progress on critical security and political milestones. In this regard, the Federal Government of Somalia should be encouraged to demonstrate concrete strategic level progress on both the security and political fronts.

Annex II

Communiqué

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), at its 741st meeting held on 19 December 2017, received a briefing on the situation in Somalia and the implementation of the mandate of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and adopted the following decision:

Council,

1. **Takes note** of the briefings by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Somalia and Head of AMISOM, Ambassador Francisco Madeira, the AMISOM Force Commander, Lieutenant General Osman Noor Soubagleh, and the Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for Somalia, Mr. Michael Keating. Council **also takes note** of the statements made by the representatives of Egypt, in its capacity as an African Member of the UN Security Council (A3); Ethiopia, in its capacity as, both Chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and a member of the A3; IGAD; and the European Union (EU);

2. **Recalls** its previous decisions on the situation in Somalia and AMISOM, including Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(DCC) adopted at its 700th meeting held on 12 July 2017; Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(DCLXXXIV) adopted at its 684th meeting held on 28 April 2017; Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(DCXLIX) adopted at its 649th meeting held on 16 January 2017; Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM (DCXXII) adopted at its 622nd meeting held on 6 September 2016; Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM (DCVIII) adopted at its 608th meeting held on 29 June 2016; and Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.2(DXCV) adopted at its 595th meeting held on 28 April 2016;

3. **Also recalls** UNSC Resolution 2372 (2017), particularly paragraph 9, in which the Security Council requests the AU to keep the UNSC regularly informed on the implementation of AMISOM's mandate;

4. **Takes note** of the progress made in the political process in Somalia, in particular with regard to State formation process, the constitutional review, as well as the electoral system towards 2020 elections. In the same context, Council **welcomes** the signing of an important reconciliation agreement between the President of Galmudug and the Head of AL Suna Wal Jammah, and **congratulates** President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmaajo for the convening of the nine-day high-level consultative meeting with the top political leadership of the country. Council **commends** the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) for its continued efforts in the search for a lasting solution to the protracted political and security challenges facing Somalia and **reiterates** its commitment to continue supporting the Federal Government of Somalia in achieving its security and political goals;

5. **Notes with deep concern** the growing capacity of al-Shabaab and its continued attacks against the innocent population, the symbols of the Federal Government and AMISOM personnel. In this regard, Council **strongly condemns** these terrorist attacks and **expresses** AU's heartfelt condolences to Government and people of Somalia for the loss of lives and **wishes speedy recovery** to all those who have sustained injuries;

6. **Also expresses its heartfelt condolences** to the Governments of the AMISOM Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) as well as to the immediate families of all AMISOM personnel who have paid the ultimate sacrifice in the promotion of peace, security, stability and reconciliation in Somalia. Council

encourages AMISOM to remain resolute and steadfast in discharging its mandate until the al-Shabaab terrorist group is completely eliminated and Somalia is pacified;

7. **Welcomes** the progress made to date in the fight against the al-Shabaab terrorist group, thanks to the joint efforts by AMISOM and the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF), noting al-Shabaab's unprecedented capacities. In this respect, Council **wishes to underline** the urgent need for AMISOM to be equipped with the necessary capacity, including force enablers and multipliers;

8. **Strongly reaffirms the need** for AMISOM to be provided with a predictable and sustainable funding, with a view to enabling it to more effectively discharge its mandate, in line with the conclusions of the AU-UN Joint Review;

9. **Expresses** its gratitude to the UN, the EU and other bilateral, as well as multilateral partners for their continued support for AMISOM operations against al-Shabaab and **urges** them to pursue and intensify their support;

10. **Reiterates the urgent need** for greater coordination and coherence in the provision of support to the building of a capable and inclusive Somalia Security Sector, with a view to expedite the progress required in facilitating effective assumption of full responsibility by the Somalia national security institutions from AMISOM. In this context, Council **reiterates the need** for partners to work closely with the Somali authorities and AMISOM to ensure enhanced coordination of support, including in the conduct of bilateral capacity-building initiatives and offensive operations;

11. **Further reiterates the need** for a responsive, effective, efficient and responsible field support platform as a strategic enabler to AMISOM operations. In this regard, Council **requests** the UN Support Office to Somalia (UNSOS) to continue to enhance its delivery of support package to AMISOM, taking into account the need to strengthen the role of the AU Special Representative and Head of AMISOM to this effect, in line with the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and UN on the provision of support to AMISOM;

12. **Takes notes** of the outcomes of the Somalia Security Conference and the Somalia Partnership Forum which took place on 4 and 5 December in Mogadishu, and **underscores** that the continued presence of AMISOM in Somalia and the implementation of a viable transition necessitates the securing of predictable and sustainable funding for AMISOM and Somali security institutions;

13. **Welcomes** the steps being already taken by the Commission in addressing the current resource gaps and **requests** the Chairperson of the Commission to enhance its engagements with the UN Secretary General and other partners, at the required level, in securing predictable and sustainable funding for AMISOM, including through the utilisation of UN Assessed Contributions for the payment of allowances for AMISOM uniformed personnel, bearing in mind the successes made by the Mission, the transition time-frame proposed by the AU-UN Joint Review and, the reality that AMISOM represents an exemplary AU-UN strategic and operational partnership in the implementation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and in the spirit of the UN-AU Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, signed on 19 April 2017;

14. **Urges** the UNSC to consider the report of the AU-UN Joint Review and to endorse its recommendations, in order to pave the way for its speedy and effective implementation, taking into consideration the need to avoid a security vacuum in Somalia and the region, enhance coordination and ensure predictable funding for AMISOM;

15. **Takes note** of the findings of Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) on Somali National Army (SNA) and **notes with concern** that the SNA, in its present state, is not yet in a position to take over or sustainably hold forward operating positions that may be handed over to it by AMISOM. In this regard, the Council **reiterates** that the transition to Somali led security and the drawdown of AMISOM need to be condition-based and gradual, to ensure that the hard won gains so far made against al-Shabaab are not reversed;

16. **Endorses** the decisions of the 25th meeting of the Military Operations Coordination Committee on 1 December 2017, which *inter alia*, envisages the revision of AMISOM Concept of Operations (CONOPS) in view of the changing dynamics in the security and political situation on the ground;

17. **Underlines the need** for the AU to renew its commitment to peace, security and stability in Somalia, taking into account the political and security dispensation in the country and the region, since the deployment of AMISOM in 2007;

18. **Reaffirms its full support** to the authorities and the people of Somalia, as well as its determination to spare no efforts towards peace, security and reconciliation in Somalia;

19. **Requests** the Commission, pursuant to paragraph 9 of the UNSC Resolution 2372 (2017), to transmit this Communiqué to the UN Secretary-General for onward transmission to the UNSC for its action, as appropriate;

20. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matters.